Branden Fini, healthcare VC and partner at Providence Ventures, joins host Ayush Jain to explain how a strategic investor picks and backs digital health companies. He traces his path from pre-med sciences into more than a decade of venture capital, then lays out the Providence Ventures model: commercial-stage companies, Providence as anchor LP, and customer access as the edge that shortens healthcare’s notoriously long adoption cycles.
He argues the market reset that began in 2022 makes this a good time to invest, because valuations are more rational. On AI, he applies the same test he uses for any company: real, differentiated results for enterprise buyers who are risk averse and budget constrained, with no premium for technology looking for a problem. The sharpest section covers what goes wrong after Series A: sales teams built before there is a lead engine, raising more than growth can justify, and founders blaming the market once the early adopters run out. He closes with the two capital efficiency ratios he tracks, the firm’s move to an independent fund with more strategic LPs, and the thesis areas he’s watching: workforce, consumer engagement and behavioral health.
Branden describes Providence Ventures as a strategic firm that backs commercial-stage digital health and tech-enabled services companies, usually somewhere between about $3 million and $20 to 30 million in annual revenue, with initial checks of $5 to 10 million, leading or co-leading rounds and taking board seats. With Providence as anchor LP across two funds totaling $300 million, the team gets what he calls an “unfair information and customer access advantage”: an on-the-floor view of what health system buyers want and what actually determines whether a product gets adopted.
His point for founders is that winning a contract and getting adopted are separate problems. In healthcare “so many cooks are in the kitchen” that a differentiated, evidence-backed product can still stall if it’s sold to the wrong organization, or to the wrong person inside the right one. Steven Collens of MATTER described on this show how health systems have narrowed their appetite for early-stage risk, which makes getting the stakeholder map right even more important.
Branden reads the market through past cycles. Funds that started investing about a year after the 2001 and 2008 crashes, the 2002 and the 2009 and 2010 vintages, posted the best returns because prices were low and people were scared. He places today in that same window: a market reset that began in 2022, with public digital health multiples that fell sharply and have stabilized well below their COVID-era highs.
Under the valuations, he goes back to fundamentals. Is the need this company serves high, widespread and likely to grow? For digital health categories that lower cost and widen access, his answer is yes. What’s left to decide is who delivers it most effectively.
Generative AI has sent a wave of pitches his way, and Branden evaluates them like any other company: is it producing real, differentiated results for the customer, and doing it with better unit economics than the next option? The profile he steers clear of is the “overly engineered technology platform looking for a problem”, where money pours into the platform and the payroll while the company spends years hunting for customers. That is the argument for healthcare product development that starts from a validated problem.
He’s also skeptical of valuing a healthcare company on its deep-tech IP alone. The buyers are risk-averse enterprises (hospitals, payers, self-insured employers) with tight budgets, and they buy solutions to business or clinical problems that carry an ROI equation or another clear objective such as patient access or staff retention. For teams building AI products, that puts discovery and clinical co-design at the front of the work.
Once a company has product-market fit, Branden says the most common failure is spending too much: an oversized sales force, too many executives, R&D with no clear business reason behind it. Founder-led sales rarely prepares a team to build a sales function, and quota-carrying reps close nothing without upstream lead generation, while weak account management costs churn and expansion revenue that is usually cheaper to win than new logos. Romy Carlson made the operator’s version of this case on the show, warning against hiring an account executive before a lead generation system is in place.
On fundraising, his rule is to raise only what the next couple of years, or the path to profitability, requires. A $10 million revenue company burning $10 million a year without growing should be heading to profitability; a $20 million company burning $20 million while growing toward $50 million and then $100 million is burning for a reason. He adds a warning about CEO hubris: once the early adopters are exhausted, companies start blaming the market or the customer, when “the only thing you can control is yourself.”
The first is a burn ratio: annual EBITDA loss against net new revenue, meaning this year’s revenue minus last year’s, including growth from existing customers. For companies that aren’t yet profitable he wants to see at least 0.5, trending toward 1, so every dollar burned produces 50 cents to a dollar of new revenue.
The second is sales and marketing efficiency: new annual revenue generated for every dollar spent on sales and marketing, people and non-people costs included. He puts the range at two-to-one to three-to-one, with $3 of new annual revenue per dollar pointing to a highly efficient function.
Hello everyone, welcome to another episode of HealthTech with Purpose. Today we have Branden Fini joining us on our show. Branden is a healthcare VC and partner at Providence Ventures, a strategic venture capital firm focused on digital health, tech-enabled healthcare services, and medtech. Join us on this exciting episode, where Branden’s insights provide a roadmap for health tech companies looking to navigate the complex journey from product-market fit to sustainable growth. Hi Branden, how are you?
I’m doing great, thanks for having me.
Yes, it’s a pleasure, in fact, because we represent the interest of a lot of health tech companies, and I believe they are all looking forward to getting some great takeaways from this episode. So it’s our pleasure. Thank you so much for joining.
Yeah, thank you.
So Branden, let’s start with a bit about your background, if you would. You have been working in different positions and different roles. Would you like to share a bit about your journey before Providence Ventures, and then we’ll come to Providence Ventures?
Right. Yeah, my journey has, I think, taken a windy road. I don’t think I have the traditional investor background, at least in how I started out. I come from a healthcare family, so I was actually always in the sciences and technology, and that’s what I ended up studying in college. I did research in organic chemistry and got a degree in mathematics, with an eye towards actually becoming a practitioner in medicine.
When I was in college, and this was quite some time ago, I started to actually get involved in the healthcare world in practice: volunteering at hospitals, going on medical mission trips to get hands-on clinical experience with doctors, getting to know what their daily life was like, and getting a firsthand look into the healthcare system, at least within the US. Honestly, I became rather disillusioned with what a lot of providers have to go through now versus maybe 30 or 40 years ago. There’s a lot of downward pressure on economics and pricing, on autonomy. There are a lot of new corporate entrants in medicine that have made it hard for independent doctors to, I think, have the voice and the authority that they used to have.
So I became disillusioned with that phenomenon, despite my continued interest in healthcare in general and a desire to make change in healthcare. I realized that perhaps becoming a provider of medicine wasn’t the most effective way, at least for me, of making an impact in this industry that I had a lot of deep interest and passion in. So I started exploring different strategies and entry points into healthcare, trying to answer the question: how do I make an impact here, and how do I do something that is sustainable and scalable, meaning it can impact thousands or even millions of lives?
And so I came across venture capital and innovation in general. Venture capital is something I have now been in for well over a decade. Initially I had no interest in business or finance. Really, I was trying to find a vehicle or strategy that could help me achieve my more mission-driven goals within healthcare, and I found that healthcare venture capital was an effective vehicle. Not a silver bullet to all of healthcare’s problems, of course, but an effective vehicle for certain strategies that were trying to make a scalable impact in healthcare.
Because really, by creating companies, you’re locking arms with founders and other investors to take a shot, with some resources and know-how and network, to do something new. Whether it’s an entirely new category on the riskier end, or maybe it’s an existing category, an existing sector, and you’ve found a new way to solve an existing problem. Whatever the exact archetype is, all you’re doing is trying to fund and build ideas that could potentially make an impact on millions of patients’ lives. That’s really what attracted me to this space, because of my genesis as a person.
I started out at a place called Sandbox Industries and have found my way to Providence Ventures now. I’m happy to give you more detail on our strategy, but that’s really what brought me here: a healthcare-first, finance-second mentality and journey.
Okay, very interesting. I mean, that’s so unique, because it’s hard to find a person in venture capital with a cause like yours, where you have had finance taking a back seat and basically brought your mission to the forefront, where you want it to be. So that’s very interesting. And I can guess founders may get some empathy from you, with the way you described creating an impact and changing livelihoods as the most important goal.
Yeah, I appreciate that. And this actually mirrors a discussion around, when you look at the different venture capital strategies out there, there’s strategic investing versus financial investing and everything in between. For me, that mirrors my personal spectrum, in my head, of: am I an impact investor or am I a financial investor? And for me, a lot of times, maybe most of the time, those aren’t mutually exclusive things.
We’re not an impact fund. We’re paid and measured off of financial returns. But because we’ve chosen healthcare as a sector, everything we invest in has an impact on caregivers’ lives, on patients’ lives, name your healthcare stakeholder. Even though we are driving towards generating a venture-class return, none of our 28 companies lacks a mission aspect, because it’s healthcare.
Makes sense. So tell us more about the thesis of Providence Ventures. Of course, it’s one of the largest names for health founders, but in your own words, what is the thesis of Providence Ventures, and what makes it stand out as a choice for healthcare founders? And who would be the right fit? Because that’s important to understand: who should be looking at raising from, or being a part of, Providence Ventures, and who should be avoiding it, if there is anything like that.
Right. So I’ll give you the checklist version first, so it’s clear what we do and who we look for, and then overlay the differentiated strategy that we’ve used to, I think, drive outsized returns and win the best deals.
On a surface, superficial level, we’re a venture capital firm that focuses on private healthcare companies, mostly those in the digital health or tech-enabled services universe. So basically any company that’s using technology to address the top priorities for a variety of healthcare stakeholders. Mainly providers and payers; self-insured employers and even pharma are the four customer markets we tend to look at most.
These companies are commercial stage, so we’re not seed-stage investors. They’re generating revenue, they have at least emerging product-market fit, and we’ll enter companies that go all the way up to maybe 20 or 30 million of annual revenue that are approaching the growth equity zone. If I were to put it in numbers, our comfort zone is companies doing maybe three million or so of annual revenue a year, all the way up to 20 to 30 million. But that’s not a hard mandate. We’ve gone earlier than that, and we’ve also gone later than that. Most of them are unprofitable when we first invest. We are investing a minimum of 5 million initially, up to 10 or so million initially, in businesses. We tend to lead or at least co-lead our rounds, and we’ll take board seats. So that’s the general profile of how we operate tactically.
But taking a step back, the investor market is very crowded. I’m sure we’ll get into this in the conversation, but the amount of dry powder, just available capital to be deployed into private companies, that volume is at historic highs right now. So it’s a very crowded market, and there aren’t a lot of high-quality companies or high-quality assets. So you have this supply-demand mismatch, and it creates two things. One, it keeps valuations rich and frothy, even in a market that’s been reset post-COVID, and we can talk about that. The second dynamic is that it’s very competitive. First you have to find the best company; that’s part one. But part two is convincing them to take your money. It’s a very, very hard dynamic, trying to win the best deal at terms that are rational and putting enough money to work.
We recognize that wholeheartedly. Looking at my personal history, I’ve experienced that for over a decade now: just how hard that part of the job and the capital deployment strategy is. So what we’ve done is build ourselves upon what I call a strategic platform. We started out as a lone limited partner (LP) model, with Providence as our anchor LP. To date we’ve managed two funds on their behalf, 300 million collectively. And Providence is not a financial LP. They are one of the largest, most diversified stakeholders in the healthcare ecosystem.
So by deploying capital on their behalf and being more or less integrated in that organization, we as investors have had this unfair information and customer access advantage, to get an on-the-floor look at not only where the market’s going, but what customers want and what the determinants are for successful adoption. Not just winning a contract and getting adopted in the market, but also understanding the nuances of a sales cycle and an adoption cycle. It’s one thing to win a customer contract and sell your solution. It’s another thing to actually, over time, reduce the time it takes for your solution to get adopted. Because in healthcare, these sales cycles and adoption cycles are notoriously complex and notoriously long-winded, and so many cooks are in the kitchen.
It’s very hard. You could have the best product in the world, one that’s differentiated, that’s actually effectuating hard return on investment (ROI), and all of that is evidence-backed. But if you’re not selling to the right stakeholder, if you’re not selling to the right organization, let alone the right individual within the right organization, your solution either won’t get adopted or the adoption cycle will be slow. So having that nuanced understanding of the stakeholder dynamics, the budgets and the priorities and the incentives of all of these, like I said, cooks in the kitchen, that will make or break a company that is otherwise remarkable in its technology and its own innovation.
So, to your question around what our investment thesis and strategy is: we have leveraged our relationship with Providence and used that as a cornerstone for our network with other integrated delivery networks, other health systems, to build this strategic platform and network where we’re helping the best companies map to the right stakeholder that has the budget and the priorities that actually match those businesses. And the end result is reducing the adoption cycle.
To talk more tangibly about that: as I mentioned earlier, we’ve invested in 28 companies, and all of them have partnered with an organization we’ve introduced them to and that we’ve helped navigate, and that includes Providence. So that type of customer access and adoption cycle reduction is really what we emphasize. That’s one of our key metrics of success, and something that will continue.
Right, right. No, makes sense, especially since we all know how hard and different it is to build a successful health company like this. You have to be prepared for the long game, basically. Health isn’t like e-commerce or typical businesses where you just launch and do it. You have to be ready, like waging war on five fronts. I think the VCs in this space have to follow the same, because VC money, I think, would take a longer tenure to come back if you are invested in health.
One of the things that stands out, which you mentioned as well, is pretty much right in the definition of Providence Ventures: that you are a strategic venture capital firm. Can you define the term a bit more clearly? What exactly it means, and again, probably what it does not mean, if there’s anything like that?
Yeah, no, that’s actually a question with more complexity than one would initially think. We pride ourselves on being a strategic investor, which we actually believe is distinct from a corporate venture capital investor. I’d say corporate VC is perhaps a subset of strategic investing, but there are other forms.
For us, what strategic investing means is that you are trying to deliver two forms of returns, in a way. You’re delivering financial returns by selling businesses and returning that capital to your LPs, but you’re also trying to invest in businesses that are relevant to the strategic priorities of your LPs. And that second goal of strategic alignment, in and of itself, comes in many different flavors, many different forms, and we can talk about the different archetypes I’ve seen in the market.
But for us, we’ve drawn a line in the sand: we are going to be measured and compensated off of financial returns, so that’s our primary goal. But we also emphasize the importance of providing access for our companies to our LP base. What that means is, at the end of the day, we want a majority of our portfolio companies to be working with our LP base in some way. It might not mean all of them are working with our LP base, but I think a majority has to, in order to signal to the market that we’re a strategic investor.
But more to the point, why is that even important? Why be a strategic investor? I think it all comes down to how you differentiate yourself in a very crowded market while trying to win the best deals. How do you look entrepreneurs in the eye and say, “Hey, we’re more than just money. We’re not going to just sit on your cap table”?
Specialization.
Yeah, yeah, it’s specialization. And it also is hard evidence that you can actually give them something that helps grow their business more than just funding. By maintaining that emphasis on strategic alignment, we’re able to do that for companies. I think that’s the reason.
On the flip side, we also have to raise money ourselves. We have to raise funds, and we have to recruit limited partners to be the lifeblood of what we do, and we also want to differentiate for them. So it’s not just for the entrepreneurs, but also for the LPs. There are tons of funds out there. Why do they invest in us? Yes, we have good financial returns, but there are a lot of funds that have good financial returns. We need to differentiate ourselves by more than just that singular dimension, and strategic alignment is how we do it. That’s what we’ve done for Providence for the past decade. But happy to double-click on any of that. I know there are a lot of different flavors of strategic investing.
Right, right, no, thanks for that. And do you see such strategic investors in other domains as well? We know in health you have been one of the great examples of strategic investment. Have you seen such strategic venture capital firms in other domains as well?
Oh yeah. There are three domains that come to mind. Google has Google Ventures, and Microsoft has M12, M12 Ventures. So in technology you’ll see corporate venture capital. You’ll see it in financial services and insurance: Prudential has PruVen Capital. And the first firm I was a part of, Sandbox, one of their main strategies is healthcare, and that’s how I got started, as I mentioned, but they also have a fund called the Cultivian fund that invests in agricultural technology. So that’s a long list of examples to paint the picture that corporate venture capital, I think, is everywhere.
And the question is, why is corporate venture capital even a thing within these larger corporations? There are different goals for these corporations. There are maybe three or four strategies that I’ve seen, and all of these strategies fall into one of these buckets. One is that you invest in these early-stage assets with an eye towards potentially acquiring them later on. So it’s a low-risk way to enter into a strategy, and in a way you’re outsourcing research and development (R&D) via venture capital investing. And by the time you acquire the asset, if you do, you’re not acquiring the whole thing. You’ve already purchased a portion of the company earlier on, when the price was lower. So it’s a way…
…to already have some sort of terms built in.
Exactly, exactly, exactly. And you’ve had time, whether it’s two, three, four, five years, to see the asset mature, because you were an earlier investor. So you’re doing diligence over that period of time, as opposed to seeing it for the first time and wanting to acquire it. That’s probably a primary strategy that a lot of other industries have used, not just healthcare.
One that’s more common within healthcare, especially from these emerging health system venture arms, is that maybe you invest not with an eye towards acquiring it, but to strengthen an existing partnership you have with that company. A lot of these health systems will work with a vendor, a third party, and their venture arm will invest in that third party to strengthen the commercial relationship and to help the health system benefit from the value that it creates. By paying this vendor, you’re paying them; that’s their revenue. If you own a piece of the company, that’s value back to you as well, as an investor.
Right, right.
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True. So let me touch upon the two most frequently asked questions, I would say, for any venture partner today. One: where is the market now? What should we be reading in the market? Has it already hit the most difficult phase, and now it’s going to get back to the easy phase, or is it going to get more difficult? Where are we headed? And second, with equal priority: what are we really thinking about AI?
So to hit your first question, I think there are two ways to help answer that. One, you can look at current trends and signs we’ve seen in the market to help paint the picture you’re trying to paint, and I’ll get to that. But the second, and the easier one, is to look at past economic cycles. When you look at the dot-com bubble burst in 2001, and then again the recession in 2008, and you look at not just the stock market but the private funding market and the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market, which is more relevant to us, and you look at valuations, they follow a pretty predictable trend.
To put it in terms of what that means for us now: the best-performing funds, VC and private equity funds, are those that started investing about a year after the economic crash. So if the bubble burst was 2001, the 2002 vintages had the best returns. In the 2008 recession, the 2009 and 2010 funds had the best returns. And the reason for that is because prices are low and people are scared, so it’s an opportunity to invest in high-quality assets that are actually reasonably priced.
We’re in that time period right now. Whether or not we actually had a recession is under question; it’s a little unclear. But what is clear is we had a market reset in 2022, and it’s still going on, and we’ve had a lot of economic uncertainty. So right now is a great time to invest and start a fund, because prices are more rational. Valuations of businesses are more rational. A leading indicator of that, which is very easy to point to, is the public market. The multiples and prices for digital health, along with every other sector, dropped precipitously starting at the beginning of 2022. That trend has stabilized a little bit, but prices are nowhere near what they used to be at the height of COVID.
So that’s a long way of answering your question on where we are today. Where we’re at today is, say what you want about when the public markets will reopen or when the M&A markets will reopen, it’s hard to predict the exact timing of that. But what the data suggests is that right now is a great time to invest, because prices are being rationalized.
And ultimately, when you look at the fundamentals of why an asset is attractive, forget the valuation for a minute, it’s all about what needs they are serving. Are the needs this solution is addressing high? Are they widespread? Are these needs going to remain and even grow in the long term? For a lot of digital health companies, or at least digital health categories, the answer is yes. They’re trying to decrease costs and increase access, and these are needs and desires of the healthcare industry at large, and it’s always been that way. So I don’t see the need for a lot of these companies going away. It’s just going to be a question of who’s going to do it most effectively, and that’s who you obviously want to invest in.
No, makes sense. We also call it the efficiency wave. So basically it’s all about building efficiency within whatever is already there, and creating value out of the bottom line, if I may say.
The second question was about AI. Where do you see AI going in VC circles? Of course, I would think you are bombarded with AI-based companies being, I’d say, the perennial solution to everything that was a problem earlier. And as a VC, you have to find value that is still, in a way, not apparent. You have to find those shiny stars, so somehow you also have to count on the future. But then how do you assess those possibilities when it comes to AI?
Yeah. So this new, renewed interest in AI, with generative AI now being sold widespread and in consumers’ hands, there’s definitely a wave of companies coming our way. But I think we evaluate them more or less the same as we do other companies. Which is: you can be AI, you can be machine learning, you can be the man behind the curtain doing it all with no technology. However you’re doing it, if it’s leading to real results for the customer and delivering value, then we’re interested. And if you’re delivering value in a way that’s differentiated, and you’re doing it better than the next guy, and even better, not only are you doing it better from the customer’s perspective, but you’re doing it more efficiently, so it’s better unit economics for you as a company, then that’s the winning combination. If generative AI is the main driver of that winning combination, then we’re all in.
But what we’ve often run into, whether it’s this new iteration of AI or former iterations of AI, is companies that are just overly engineered technology platforms looking for a problem, versus the other way around: let’s identify the problem first, and then you build the optimal solution for that problem or problems. When you’re just technology looking for a problem, is there a chance you’ll still find the problem and fix it? Yes, of course there is, but the risk is so high.
When you’re in that situation, one of the common pitfalls is it becomes, and I used this word earlier, overly engineered. You pour all this money into building the platform, and then you’re also burning money along the way paying for the people, and you’re just burning operating capital while you try to find a customer or customers and try to grow the company. Then five or 10 or 15 years go by and you’re nowhere. So that type of profile is something we would steer clear of. But if you’re using AI to solve a current need, and there are early signs that you’re doing it well, and there are clear differentiators and defensibility characteristics, then that’s something we would get behind.
So, just elaborating on that aspect: one is AI just enabling something, and the other is AI being the deep tech behind the whole solution or the value proposition. Would you say you’re still more inclined to look at whether the problem is getting solved or not, rather than whether there’s deep tech which has its own intellectual property (IP)?
Yeah, good question. It’s definitely the former. Investing in just a deep tech solution that is valued based off of its inherent technical IP, I don’t know how successful a strategy that is in healthcare. I can’t speak for the tech world, because I know those guys have a different mindset, and they have different adoption cycles, and their customer markets are much different.
But in healthcare, at the end of the day, the primary customers you’re selling to, you’re not selling to patients most of the time. I know they are oftentimes users and beneficiaries, but you’re selling to enterprises: selling to hospitals, to payers, and in the digital world, pharma is also making inroads. These are enterprise customers that are risk averse, and they have tight budgets, with the exception of pharma, and that’s a whole other conversation.
But when it comes to digital health, most often you’re selling to hospitals or payers or employers that are covering their employees, and most of the time they’re not making these big bets on fancy technology platforms. They’re making bets on things that are solving their business or clinical problems, that have an ROI equation. Or if it’s not ROI, maybe it’s some other business objective, like patient access or employee satisfaction and talent recruitment and retention. Whatever it is, it’s a clear business objective.
Yeah. What about the mistakes that companies beyond Series A make? It would be very interesting to know, because usually they say that finding the first customer is tougher than finding 10 and then 100. So once health companies especially have product-market fit, where do they really fail, Branden? What has been your experience, and what lessons do companies learn?
Right. So I think for a business that has achieved product-market fit, the natural imperative is to grow and scale and replicate what they’ve done with the few customers they have at that point. And I think the primary pitfall for a company as it goes down that scaling path has to do with how much money you raise and how you deploy it. There are a lot of decision trees that go into that, but I think the overarching issue is that companies will oftentimes just spend too much money after that point.
So when you have a company that’s achieved product-market fit, they’ll go on to build a big sales force, or they’ll hire too many executives, or they’ll pour all this money into R&D without clear business reasons as to why they’re building product X, Y, or Z. Or on the sales and marketing front, it has been founder sales up to that point, so they’ve never built a sales force before and don’t know how to do it efficiently. As one example, it doesn’t matter how many quota-carrying reps you have; if you don’t have upstream lead generators actually providing qualified leads, nothing’s going to get closed or processed. If you don’t have a great account management function, your existing customer base will go by the wayside, and either you’ll experience churn or you’ll experience a lack of customer expansion and same-store growth, which is more efficient than new logos because you’ve already acquired those customers. It usually takes less money to expand existing customers. So a lot of these efficiency questions, I think, come in the form of issues for companies that are trying to scale.
Another thing related to that: as you go on to raise more and more money, the key question is how much money you raise and who you raise from. When you get closer to profitability or become profitable, how much of that should come from equity investors versus debt, term loans? These are all questions our companies have to grapple with periodically as they get bigger. One of the problems that comes from that is companies end up raising too much money. So if you’re a 10 or [inaudible] million revenue a year business and you raise $100 million… Well, you only raise as much money as you need for the next couple of years, or to get to profitability if that’s within the next couple of years. If you’re raising 100 million, that means you’re going to spend $100 million in 24 months. And the only way spending $100 million and burning through that money makes any sense is if you have the growth to support it.
So here’s some math for you. Just to make it easy: if you’re burning $10 million a year and you’re a $10 million a year revenue company, but you’re not growing, that’s not good. If you’re not growing, $10 million of burn a year is just… you should be getting to profitability, because that money burn is not leading to growth, and that is completely inefficient. Versus if you’re burning $20 million a year but you’re a $20 million a year company growing to 50, then growing to 100. That burn, even though it’s greater than 10, is leading to new revenue, and that is justifiable. That’s the reason to burn money: because it’s leading to growth. So for companies that are raising a lot of money, the only reason you should be doing that is if you have the growth to justify it.
Trying to think of other mistakes. I think hubris in general, hubris of CEOs. As you acquire one, five, 10 customers, you eventually get to a point where you’ve exhausted the early adopters. You start to enter a segment of the market where there are no more early adopters; you have them all. Now you’re entering customers that are more representative of the broader market. And you’re jazzed because you have these early adopters that you may not think are early adopters, and you think they’re representative of the entire market. So you start not being honest with yourself when you’re running into issues with customers. Is it the company’s fault? Is it the customer’s fault? Is this competitor really better than us, or does this customer just not get it, they don’t understand our model?
We come across it all the time: companies, once they get scaled, will make up excuses as to why they’re not winning any more business and have tapped out on growth. It’s because the market doesn’t understand us, or this customer is a problem. Well, it doesn’t matter what the reason is. You’re not growing, and the only thing you can control is yourself. So maybe you need to look yourself in the mirror and make changes.
Right, right, right. Well said. So one question to expand on the idea you just mentioned, Branden: what kind of ratios or any financial [inaudible] would you look at on a quarterly or ongoing basis, just to make sure that, like you mentioned with the math, the math is not going wrong?
You’re talking about metrics we use to give us an idea of capital efficiency?
Yeah, yeah.
So two metrics come to mind. I gave a math example earlier, which is the amount you burn relative to growth. A good metric to look at is, on an annual basis, how much money have you burned, operating capital. Some people will use your EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) loss as a proxy for that; that’s fine. So let’s look at your EBITDA loss relative to not your overall revenue for the year, but your new revenue. Meaning, if you made 20 million of revenue this year and last year’s revenue was 10 million, the new revenue is 10 million, because that’s how much you added. So we look at your burn relative to the new revenue that burn created.
But you mean new revenue from new accounts, or new revenue overall?
No, no, no. Basically current year’s revenue minus last year’s revenue.
Okay.
The revenue added, and that could be from existing customers as well. So the end result is some number, and the number we like to see for companies that aren’t profitable, because once they are profitable there is no burn and it’s not relevant, is a minimum of 0.5, trending towards one. Meaning for every dollar you’re burning, you’re generating a minimum of 50 cents of new revenue, up to a dollar of new revenue. And if that trend is increasing, that suggests increasing efficiency, basically. So I think that’s the catch-all metric for burn.
But we actually look at even more specific metrics around efficiency levels for certain divisions within the company. We’ll look at sales and marketing efficiency, as one example. For every dollar you invest in sales and marketing, people and non-people, how much new sales are you generating? That metric can range anywhere from two-to-one to three-to-one. So if for every dollar into sales and marketing you’re generating $3 of new annual revenue, that would suggest a highly efficient and attractive sales and marketing function.
Okay, interesting. So lastly, Branden, I would like to know about the new fund you have just launched. What is it about, and where are you with that?
Right. So I referenced a little bit of this earlier, around how historically we’ve had this single-LP model with Providence as our single LP. Moving forward, what we’re going to do is basically replicate and scale that. We’re going to bring that level of engagement, of strategic engagement, that we’ve had with Providence to a select few other strategic organizations, health systems or integrated delivery networks. So we’re going to have a small handful of other strategic LPs, with Providence as an anchor. They’re still going to be a partner of ours, a big one, and we’re going to replicate our success.
The reason we’re doing that is that by having a diversified LP base, you have more customer access for your companies. We have a network of other health systems beyond just Providence, and other payers, but they’re not investors in us, so they don’t have this captive attention that comes from a financial interest and a vested interest in our success. By expanding and diversifying your LP base, that captive interest increases, so that’s naturally just attractive for companies. And it allows Providence to spread capital risk; they’re not the only ones on the hook for actually investing capital.
The other dynamic, in addition to diversifying the LP base: historically we’ve been legally a part of Providence. Now we’ll be outside of Providence. We’ll be a spun-out entity, legally speaking just an independent venture capital firm, and Providence will be a large LP. It’ll give us more flexibility and enable us to move faster and operate the way we’ve always wanted to operate. That’s better for us and our companies, obviously, but also better for the LPs, because we’re less onerous on their resources and their operations. So those will be the changes moving forward, and we’re thrilled to make it happen.
The one important point to make, though, is what won’t change: our investment strategy. We’re still investing in companies that are solving the top pain points for the stakeholders we care about, for our LP base. We’re still investing at a similar stage, our check sizes will be somewhat similar, we’re the same team, and our existing portfolio is still there. I think the only difference is more flexibility. We’re basically taking the best of the former Providence Ventures and combining that with a better, more scalable platform.
Okay, okay. And would you also foresee… One of the themes I’ve seen with some of the firms nowadays is sub-segmenting, or going super niche into some moonshot areas like oncology, or cardiac, or rehab, or hospital at home. So are you also planning to take on any particular themes in the near future, or will it remain a bit more general, across the board?
Yeah, that’s a good question. We’ll do what we’ve always done, which is: our areas of interest, whether it’s hospital at home, which you mentioned, or other thesis areas, our thesis areas will be driven by the priorities of the stakeholders we care about. When you think about those stakeholders, like I said, it’s payers, it’s providers, it’s self-insured employers, and even pharma, with a special focus on our LP base, as you’d imagine.
So when you look at the top priorities for those stakeholders, some of the investable categories that have come from that, just to give you some tangible examples: providers have a severe staffing shortage issue. Finding doctors and nurses and retaining them is pain points one through five for hospitals. So new early-stage and growth-stage companies that come in and help with those issues, maybe they’re helping with recruiting and retaining, or maybe they’re optimizing existing labor forces so that the same nurse can do more and more without getting burnt out, of course, and maybe AI is in there to help streamline administrative burdens. Workforce and labor optimization is an area of interest for us.
Other things: when you think of both providers and payers, engaging the consumer is of increasing interest. It’s a very competitive market. You have these new entrants, like Amazon buying One Medical, and you have Optum and United being the biggest employer of doctors in the country. So you have these new market entrants that are stealing local share from the traditional care providers, and finding solutions that help engage the consumer and build that more continuous and modern relationship is always of interest to us.
And I’ll give you one last example: behavioral health. Behavioral health has been a buzzword for a long time, but the issue it has had for a long time is who’s going to pay for it. A lot of that has changed now. Because of COVID, behavioral health has come into increasing focus as a crisis across the board, particularly for specific populations like adolescents and children. Behavioral health issues, specialty areas like substance use disorder, or, one last one, autism and applied behavior analysis (ABA) therapy. Behavioral health has been deconstructed into discrete categories because of how much it’s being emphasized, so we’ll continue to look at things like that. Everyone needs behavioral health: hospitals, payers, employers. It’s a multi-stakeholder need, so it’s an attractive investment area.
Sure. Okay, okay, that gives some great insight. So thank you, Branden. I think this has been really good, and you touched upon some of the very important aspects of building in health, which is something we always look into for the podcast. And I believe it really opens the doors of imagination for many of the founders tuning in. Thank you so much, Branden.
Yeah, you got it. Thanks for having me.
Thank you for joining us on the HealthTech with Purpose podcast. Before you leave, make sure to like and subscribe on Spotify, Apple, and YouTube. And if you would like to see someone on this podcast, do refer them to us; my contact details are in the description. Before I leave, I wish you: stay healthy, stay curious, and keep building.
At the time of recording (published August 2024), Branden Fini was a healthcare venture capitalist and partner at Providence Ventures, a strategic venture capital firm investing in digital health, tech-enabled healthcare services and medtech. He studied the sciences, did research in organic chemistry and earned a degree in mathematics on a path toward medicine, then moved into venture capital, where he had worked for more than a decade. He started at Sandbox Industries before joining Providence Ventures, which by his account had managed two funds totaling $300 million on behalf of Providence, invested in 28 companies, and was spinning out as an independent firm with Providence as a large LP. That spin-out has since happened: in January 2025 Providence Ventures became the independent Allumia Ventures, where he is a partner. LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/branden-m-fini/
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